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Abstract 
 
Together with other variables, human factors play a central role in the safety of highly complex 
technical systems such as nuclear power plants. However, despite the unquestionable importance 
of human factors, little information is available about relevant ability requirements for control 
room jobs in nuclear power plants. The purpose of this study was to close this gap, to provide 
specific information about ability requirements for such jobs, and to evaluate how several 
hypothesized factors (ability domain, type of jobs, and operating conditions) contribute to ability 
requirements. We found that high levels of cognitive as well as social/interpersonal abilities are 
needed for control room jobs, and that ability requirements increase with the hierarchical job 
level for these two domains but decrease for psychomotor/physical abilities and for 
sensory/perceptual abilities. Furthermore, specifically concerning jobs with a leadership function, 
we found some differences between incidents and normal operations regarding requirements for 
social/interpersonal abilities, indicating that the former require a different leadership style than 
the latter.  
 
Keywords: nuclear power plants; job analysis; ability requirements; control room jobs; nuclear 
safety 
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Job analysis of control room jobs in nuclear power plants 
 
1. Introduction 
Safety is a key issue in the field of nuclear energy. However, prior to the accident at Three 
Mile Island, human factors had received little attention in nuclear safety research. Following the 
Three Mile Island accident, all nuclear accidents were reviewed, and it was found that human 
error contributes to nuclear accidents (Carvalho et al., 2006).  
According to Carvalho et al. (2006), as a result of this finding, human error and human 
behavior have come to be treated with the same attention as technical (hardware) systems. Thus, 
it has now been acknowledged that human error constitutes an important factor in the 
malfunctioning of complex technical systems such as nuclear power plants and in accidents 
associated with their operation, meaning that human error is a significant contributor to plant risk. 
In line with this, estimates have been made in the literature that between 20 and 70% of all 
system failures at nuclear power plants are due to human error (cf. Fleishman and Buffardi, 
1999). Similarly, events reported in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)/Nuclear 
Energy Agency (NEA) incident reporting system (IRS), a worldwide data collection system that 
tracks unusual events in nuclear power plants (NEA, 2004), show that inadequate human action is 
responsible for 48% of all reported events. Only a small number of IRS events were found to be 
due to purely technical causes or to new phenomena causing non-expected plant behavior. These 
figures stress the importance of the human factors in the field of nuclear safety. Therefore, 
minimizing human error is a fundamental aim in the nuclear industry, and one which becomes 
even more apparent when considering the literature, in which it is assumed that even relatively 
small improvements in human error probabilities can result in substantial improvements in many 
accident sequences (Samanta et al., 1988).  
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To describe nuclear accident sequences, a system perspective including both human errors 
and technical system components as well as the organizational context seems to be most 
appropriate (e.g., Hofmann et al., 1995). From such a perspective, various factors are important to 
avoid accidents. On the technical side, defenses-in-depth systems exist to avoid potentially 
dangerous events (i.e., systems in which multiple layers of protection are used so that each layer 
guards against a possible breakdown of the other layers). These systems are influenced by 
organizational factors such as management decisions, organizational processes, corporate culture, 
and others. At the workplace, error-producing and violation-producing work conditions may 
exist. Job incumbents can also contribute to accidents through unconscious errors and/or 
conscious violations. These technical and human conditions contribute to the probability of 
accident sequences (Reason, 1997, 2008). In this respect, Reason used a metaphor to describe the 
conditions for accidents to occur. He entitled this concept “the Swiss cheese model”, to reflect 
that defensive layers are like slices of Swiss cheese, which contain holes, but where the presence 
of a defensive hole in any one slice does not normally lead to an accident. Instead, accidents can 
occur only when holes in successive layers overlap, meaning that there is a trajectory of accident 
opportunity that brings hazards into damaging contact with victims. Thus, according to this 
model, in order for an accident to occur, many unlikely factors have to operate concurrently, 
which also means that several different components of defenses-in-depth systems must fail 
simultaneously. 
There are various sources among the factors mentioned that can influence the occurrence 
of human errors (cf. Buffardi et al., 2000). Some of these sources concern aspects of the work 
environment or of the job, such as the plant type (pressurized water reactor vs. boiling water 
reactor), organizational safety climate, the type of job within a plant, or the operating conditions 
of a plant, while others concern the characteristics of the employees who perform the jobs in a 
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plant. An important source of human error is said to be a poor match between employees’ 
abilities and relevant job requirements (Buffardi et al., 2000). Human abilities are important in 
several different ways. First, employees are less likely to make errors if they are able to cope with 
the requirements of their job. Clearly, a match between employees’ abilities and job requirements 
is important in every job, but it is especially crucial for employees in high-reliability 
organizations like nuclear power plants. Second, abilities can also be used to actively prevent 
incidents and accidents (e.g., Reason, 2008). Therefore, an important goal is to determine which 
abilities are relevant for jobs in nuclear power plants. 
There are a number of different ways in which to improve the fit between employees’ 
abilities and the different job requirements. Selection, support, and training of employees or the 
specific adaptation of the workplace are examples of such interventions. The basis for all of these 
measures is knowledge about the requirements of a job (Ash, 1988). One important way in which 
to accurately identify relevant job requirements is to carry out systematic job analyses (Landy, 
1988). 
Despite the obvious importance of job analysis to increase nuclear safety by defining the 
job requirements, there is limited information available on the different abilities required for jobs 
in nuclear power plants. Specifically, there is no broad empirical collection of ability 
requirements concerning jobs in the control room of nuclear power plants. Although the IAEA 
emphasizes the importance of job analysis (IAEA, 2000), only a small number of technical 
reports exist, and these are difficult to access.  
Perhaps the most publicly accessible and systematically collected database in the field of 
job requirements for jobs in nuclear power plants can be found in the O*NET (i.e., the 
Occupational Network), a comprehensive database that represents the primary source of 
occupational information in the United States. O*NET is organized around a theoretical content 
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model comprising six major areas: worker characteristics, worker requirements, experience 
requirements, occupation requirements, occupational characteristics, and occupation-specific 
information (O*NET, 2010a). Specific requirements for a vast number of different jobs can be 
found in the database (M. D. Mumford and Peterson, 1999; Peterson et al., 2001). However, even 
in this database, information concerning ability requirements for jobs in nuclear power plants is 
rather undifferentiated, with only one job profile for several job positions (cf. O*NET, 2010b). 
Thus, different job positions are integrated into one job profile even though they differ, for 
example, with regard to whether or not they include leadership responsibilities. Furthermore, the 
data provided are limited to cognitive, psychomotor/physical, and sensory/perceptual abilities, 
while social/interpersonal abilities are largely omitted. Finally, the profiles and requirements do 
not distinguish between normal operations and incidents, even though these two operating states 
might place very different demands on employees concerning the abilities required. 
One of the few available studies concerning the relevance of ability requirements for 
safety in nuclear power plants was conducted by Buffardi et al. (2000). This study confirmed that 
the abilities required for tasks in nuclear power plants are related to human error probabilities, 
such that error probabilities were found to increase when a larger number of abilities or a higher 
ability level were required for a task. Again, this provides clear evidence for the role of job 
requirements. However, the number of abilities considered in this study was very restricted; no 
social and interpersonal abilities were considered, and no information was provided about the 
results of the actual job analysis.  
Given the limited information concerning the ability requirements in nuclear power 
plants, the first goal of the present study was to close this gap. Specifically, we aimed to identify 
the abilities that are required for different control room jobs, addressing cognitive, 
psychomotor/physical, sensory/perceptual, and social/interpersonal abilities. In the first of two 
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studies, our goal was to determine which ability categories are more important for different 
control room jobs. In the second study, we evaluated whether the ability level required is 
influenced by the operating condition (normal operations vs. incidents).  
 
2. Factors that Might Influence Ability Requirements 
In the following sections, we briefly review the relevant literature and develop hypotheses 
for several factors that might influence the abilities and the ability levels required for the three 
control room jobs examined. The factors considered in the present research are different ability 
domains, different control room jobs, and different operating conditions.  
 
2.1 Ability Domains 
It is clear that not all abilities or ability domains are equally important for each job. Given 
that the most important abilities for control room jobs described in the O*NET (2010b) mainly 
include cognitive abilities (i.e., eight of the ten most important abilities were from the cognitive 
domain), we assume that for control room jobs, the ability levels required are higher in the 
domain of cognitive abilities than in the domains of psychomotor/physical or sensory/perceptual 
abilities. Research in fields where human error is an important safety issue, such as the field of 
aviation psychology, shows a quite similar picture for airline pilots and air traffic controllers 
(Goeters et al., 2004). Additionally, these aviation studies also found that social and interpersonal 
abilities play an important role alongside cognitive and perceptual-motor abilities. Specifically, 
evidence from high-profile accidents in the airline industry, in which a lack of effective 
teamwork was found, stresses the importance of social and interpersonal abilities (e.g. Cannon-
Bowers and Salas, 1998; Weick, 1990). As control room employees in nuclear power plants have 
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to work in shift teams for many hours of the day and have shared responsibilities, we expect that 
they also need high levels of social and interpersonal abilities.  
Therefore, we make the following prediction: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Control room employees need a higher level of cognitive abilities 
and social/interpersonal abilities than of psychomotor/physical abilities or 
sensory/perceptual abilities. 
 
2.2 Differences between Control Room Jobs 
Different jobs and differences in tasks and responsibilities related to these jobs are another 
relevant factor for the abilities required. The three jobs covered in the present study (reactor 
operator, shift supervisor, and safety engineer) are hierarchically structured. With increasing 
hierarchical level, employees’ responsibility and decision-making power also increase (see 
below). The job of reactor operator reflects the lowest level of the hierarchy. After a few years, 
reactor operators can be promoted to shift supervisors, and then after several additional years to 
safety engineers if they have the necessary level of education (an engineering degree) in addition 
to the required abilities and experience. 
Reactor operators are responsible for the operation of nuclear installations and supervise 
the operational events and processes. Shift supervisors supervise a shift group and are responsible 
for the operation of the plant. They are responsible for control room operation and safety and 
have the authority to decide to switch off the plant. Shift supervisors also serve as the main 
communication channel from the control room to the other parts of the plant, and even outside the 
plant (Carvalho et al., 2006). Finally, safety engineers are not in the control room the whole time, 
but stand in during emergency alerts to support the shift supervisor. They also take the lead in 
Job requirements… 9
high-risk emergency alerts. In addition to their duties in the control room, they have various 
additional responsibilities outside the control room (e.g., they often serve as trainers, or have 
specific tasks relating to radiation protection or research). However, these individual duties are 
not relevant for their tasks in the control room. 
Leadership models and research suggests that the cognitive demands for leaders increase 
with their level in the leadership hierarchy (T. V. Mumford et al., 2007). Accordingly, individuals 
with leadership roles in high reliability organizations face higher demands concerning appropriate 
situation assessment or the quality of decision making (Crichton et al., 2005). Thus, given that 
control room jobs are hierarchically structured, and that the cognitive complexity of the tasks 
increases with increasing levels of seniority, we assume that the required levels of cognitive 
abilities reflect this hierarchy. Thus, we make the following prediction: 
  
Hypothesis 2: Required levels of cognitive abilities increase with the level of 
seniority of the job. 
 
Previous research has shown that the extent of social skills required of different control 
room employees also depends on their function. In a study by O’Connor et al. (2008), who used 
the critical incident technique (Flanagan, 1954) to investigate the team skills required by nuclear 
power plant operations personnel, statements about team workload management (prioritizing and 
coordinating tasks and resources) and leadership (directing and coordinating activities, 
motivating others, assessing team performance, and establishing a positive atmosphere) were 
most often related to supervisory roles, such as shift supervisors and safety engineers. Many of 
these behaviors are related to social and interpersonal abilities like behavioral flexibility, 
coordination, negotiation skills, resistance to making premature judgments, or social sensitivity. 
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Furthermore, research in the leadership domain suggests that the importance of social and 
interpersonal skills also increases with an increase in the hierarchical position of a leader (cf. the 
leadership skills strataplex model by T. V. Mumford et al., 2007). 
In addition to this, it has been argued that the quality of the relationship between 
supervisors and their subordinates (i.e., leader-member exchange, LMX) is important for safety 
because this quality is an important factor that influences the degree to which supervisors and 
subordinates communicate openly about safety issues (Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999; Reason, 
1997). Thus, supervisors’ social and interpersonal abilities, such as social sensitivity or coaching, 
are relevant for ensuring good relationships and trust between them and their subordinates.  
Finally, it has been found that certain command skills are important for people with 
leadership roles in high reliability organizations because such skills are relevant for managing 
teams and workload, coordinating important activities, providing direction, or taking charge 
when the situation requires it (Crichton et al., 2005). Social and interpersonal abilities that are 
relevant in this regard include achievement striving, assertiveness, social confidence, self-control, 
resilience, perseverance, and coordination.  
Based on the research reviewed, we also assume that individuals with leadership roles in 
the control room (i.e., shift supervisors and safety engineers) need a higher level of social and 
interpersonal abilities than individuals without leadership roles (i.e., reactor operators).  
 
Hypothesis 3: Shift supervisors and safety engineers need a higher level of 
social/interpersonal abilities than reactor operators. 
 
2.3 Differences between Operating Conditions 
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Two operating conditions can be distinguished for nuclear power plants: normal 
operations and incidents. During normal operating conditions, operators only need to maintain 
the general operating procedures for normal operation of the nuclear power plant. By contrast, 
during incidents, a large number of auditory and visual warning signals appear on the wide 
display panel and operators have to immediately and simultaneously deal with these signals and 
respond to them appropriately (cf. Lin et al., 2009).  
According to Carvalho et al. (2008), the operation of nuclear plants is characterized by a 
large amount of boredom, due to the surveillance requirements and the long-term control 
strategies needed during continuous normal operation, and a small amount of high stimulation, 
due to the need to quickly and effectively handle alarm situations. Both boredom (low mental 
workload) and stimulation (high mental workload) can affect mental performance and have a 
negative effect on system safety and operation (Hwang et al., 2008). This finding stresses the 
important role of human factors in both operating conditions. However, Crichton et al. (2005) 
found that incidents make specific requirements with regard to the quality of assessing the 
situation correctly and making appropriate decisions. Thus, it seems likely that requirements for 
cognitive abilities are higher for incidents than for normal operations, but the size of the 
differences between the ability requirements across the two working conditions remains an open 
question. Moreover, this question is especially important because large differences in the required 
abilities would make it more difficult to find suitable control room personnel and would also 
make it more difficult for control room crews to demonstrate optimal performance in both work 
conditions. Nevertheless, given the differences in the tasks related to the two conditions, it can be 
assumed that a higher level both of cognitive abilities and of sensory/perceptual abilities is 
needed in the incident condition than under normal operating conditions. 
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Hypothesis 4: A higher level of cognitive abilities and of sensory/perceptual 
abilities is required in the incident condition than in the normal operating 
condition. 
 
As mentioned above, shift supervisors hold leadership roles in the control room. As team 
leaders, they have an important influence on the team’s performance (Crichton and Flin, 2004). 
Especially in relation to complex incidents, effective leadership can help to minimize negative 
consequences (cf. Crichton et al., 2005; Kapucu and Van Wart, 2008). However, what constitutes 
effective leadership is also strongly influenced by the specific situation that a leader faces. In line 
with this, contingency models of leadership emphasize that different kinds of leadership behavior 
are effective in different situations (cf. Yukl, 2006). Specifically, in certain situations, a more 
directive style of leadership may be necessary. For example, during periods of high workload and 
pressure, such as during incidents, a directive style might be more appropriate, whereas a more 
participative leadership style seems more appropriate in slower paced situations such as under 
normal operating conditions (Crichton et al., 2005). This would also be in line with the Vroom-
Yetton model of leadership (Vroom and Jago, 1978; Vroom and Yetton, 1973) as well as with 
research suggesting that effective leaders should be able to show both a task-oriented and a 
people-oriented style of management (e.g., Judge et al., 2004) in order to effectively co-ordinate 
the efforts of the team members and to handle the demands of the different situations they face.  
With regard to incidents, this means that individuals with leadership roles need certain 
social/interpersonal abilities that are related to a more directive leadership style (e.g., 
assertiveness, behavioral flexibility, perseverance, resilience, self-control, or social confidence) 
to a stronger degree than in normal operating conditions. By contrast, they require 
social/interpersonal abilities that are related to a more participative leadership style (e.g., 
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agreeableness, coaching, negotiation, sociability, or social sensitivity) to a weaker degree. 
Accordingly, we make the following prediction: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Compared to the normal operating condition, in the incident 
condition, shift supervisors need a higher level of social/interpersonal abilities that 
are related to a directive leadership style, but a lower degree of social/interpersonal 
abilities that are related to a participative leadership style.  
 
 
3. Study 1 
The first aim of Study 1 was to determine the abilities required for control room jobs in 
nuclear power plants. The second aim was to investigate to what degree ability requirements 
differ between the different ability domains and whether the ability requirements are influenced 
by the type of job. 
 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants 
In total, 187 control room employees served as participants for the present study. Of 
these, 87 were reactor operators, 60 were shift supervisors, and 40 were safety engineers. The 
mean age was 43.98 (SD = 8.69) for reactor operators, 51.07 (SD = 6.53) for shift supervisors, 
and 49.03 (SD = 7.28) for safety engineers. Their mean amount of work experience was 10.68 
years (SD = 9.60) for reactor operators, 13.88 years (SD = 8.59) for shift supervisors, and 11.24 
years (SD = 8.61) for safety engineers. The employees came from four different nuclear power 
plants (Plants A to D). The output of the different plants increased from Plant A to Plant D. 
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Plants A and D were boiling water reactors and were both built by the same producer, while 
Plants B and C were pressurized water reactors that were built by two different producers. Plants 
A and B began operations around 1970, Plant C during the late 1970s and Plant D during the 
mid-1980s.  
 
3.1.2 Job Analysis Instrument  
To determine the ability requirements for different control room jobs, the German version 
of the Fleishman Job Analysis Survey (F-JAS, Kleinmann et al., 2010) was used. The F-JAS was 
developed from a long-standing program of research involving the identification of ability 
requirements in human task performance (Fleishman and Mumford, 1991; Fleishman and 
Quaintance, 1984; Fleishman and Railly, 1995; Kleinmann et al., 2010). The ability taxonomy 
underlying this instrument is also used in O*NET (Fleishman et al., 1999). The domains and 
abilities covered by the F-JAS taxonomy include: (a) 21 cognitive abilities; (b) 10 psychomotor 
abilities; (c) 9 physical abilities; (d) 12 sensory/perceptual abilities, and (e) 21 
social/interpersonal abilities (Fleishman, 1995, 1996).  
For each ability, a behaviorally anchored 7-point rating scale is provided, on which higher 
values reflect higher requirement levels. The scales include construct definitions, distinctions 
from similar abilities, definitions of high and low levels of each ability requirement, and task 
anchors to provide raters with examples of everyday tasks that reflect high, moderate, and low 
levels of each ability (cf. Figure 1 or Buffardi et al., 2000, for an example of such a scale; or 
Fleishman et al., 1999, for additional examples). The scale values of these task anchors were 
determined empirically and were selected due to their high reliability (Fleishman and Mumford, 
1991; Fleishman and Railly, 1995).  
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------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
The F-JAS has several advantages that make it especially suitable for the present purpose. 
First, the instrument is easy to use even when the respondents are job incumbents and not 
specifically trained job analysts (Landy, 1988). Second, it is the most rigorously developed 
instrument to determine ability requirements (Wilson, 2007) and, as mentioned above, it 
considers quite a broad field of abilities including cognitive, psychomotor/physical, 
sensory/perceptual, and social/interpersonal abilities. And third, previous empirical work has 
confirmed that the F-JAS and the scales included in it are suitable to describe jobs and tasks in a 
wide range of industrial, governmental, and military settings that also encompass safety-relevant 
jobs (Fleishman and Mumford, 1991). Interrater reliabilities for single abilities in past studies 
tended to be in the .80s and .90s when 15 or more raters were available (cf. the research reviewed 
by Buffardi et al., 2000, or by Fleishman and Mumford, 1991). In addition, the scales show 
substantial evidence of construct and predictive validity (Fleishman and Mumford, 1991; 
Kleinmann et al., 2010). 
 
3.1.3 Procedure 
In a first step, a workshop was conducted prior to the actual data collection phase in order 
to reduce the number of abilities considered in the present study and to select potentially relevant 
abilities for control room employees. During this workshop, a group with five subject matter 
experts, including one representative of each nuclear power plant and one representative of the 
government agency for nuclear safety, identified 51 abilities out of the original 73 included in the 
F-JAS, which were considered to be potentially job-relevant and were subsequently used for the 
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main data collection. Thus, 22 abilities were omitted, primarily in the area of psychomotor and 
physical abilities. 
The main survey included only the 51 abilities selected during the subject matter expert 
workshop. Data were collected in 21 group sessions during working hours in the training 
classrooms of the four nuclear power plants. Each group consisted of between 4 and 14 control 
room employees. These control room employees first received a 15-minute introduction to the 
design and usage of the F-JAS. After the researcher had clarified participants’ questions, 
participants were asked to complete the survey and to describe the ability requirements of their 
own job. At the end, participants were asked to fill in several demographic questions. Altogether, 
participants needed approximately 60 minutes to complete the survey. 
 
3.1.4 Reliability of Participants’ Ratings 
We calculated interclass correlations for participants’ ratings of the required ability levels 
in order to determine the reliability of these ratings (ICC 2,1, Shrout and Fleiss, 1979). The mean 
reliability was .98 across 87 reactor operators, .98 across 60 shift supervisors and .98 across 40 
safety engineers. These values compare favorably to estimates from previous research with the F-
JAS (Buffardi et al., 2000; Fleishman and Mumford, 1991). 
 
3.2 Results  
Tables 1 to 4 show the mean required ability levels (and standard deviations) for the three 
different control room jobs and for the different ability domains. According to Fleishman and 
Railly (1995), abilities with mean ratings of 4 and above should be considered relevant for a job. 
Thus, the vast majority of the cognitive abilities were relevant for all three jobs, and all but one of 
the social/interpersonal abilities were relevant for all three jobs. Concerning the domain of 
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sensory/perceptual abilities, about half of the abilities were relevant for the different control room 
jobs. Finally, Control Precision was the only ability from the psychomotor/physical domain that 
was relevant for two of the three jobs (reactor operators and shift supervisors). As an indicator of 
the general level of ability that is required in each of the four domains, we also determined mean 
values across all abilities for each domain. These mean values are shown in the bottom line of 
each table.  
 
3.2.1 Comparison of Ability Requirements across Ability Domains 
To evaluate Hypothesis 1, which predicted that control room employees need higher 
levels of cognitive abilities and of social/interpersonal abilities than of psychomotor/physical, or 
sensory/perceptual abilities, we conducted a 3 × 4 analysis of variance (ANOVA), in which we 
used the mean ability level from each domain as the dependent variable. This ANOVA included 
type of control room job (reactor operator, shift supervisor, or safety engineer) as a between-
subjects factor and ability domain (cognitive, social/interpersonal, psychomotor/physical, and 
sensory/perceptual) as a within-subjects factor. Degrees of freedom for the within-subjects factor 
in this and all subsequent ANOVAs were corrected according the Huynh-Feldt procedure when 
necessary (as indicated by a significant Mauchly test of sphericity).  
In line with Hypothesis 1, across all three jobs, the mean requirement level for cognitive 
and social/interpersonal abilities was higher than the mean level for psychomotor/physical and 
sensory/perceptual abilities (cf. Tables 1-4). Accordingly, the ANOVA revealed a main effect for 
ability domain, F(2.30, 422.32) = 780.58, p < .01, partial 2 = .81. Subsequent Bonferroni-
corrected pairwise comparisons between all four ability domains confirmed that the mean 
requirement levels for social/interpersonal abilities and cognitive abilities were significantly 
higher than the mean requirement levels in the other two domains. Furthermore, the mean 
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requirement level for social/interpersonal abilities was even higher than the mean requirement 
level for cognitive abilities. And finally, the mean requirement level for sensory/perceptual 
abilities required was also higher than the mean requirement level for psychomotor/physical 
abilities.  
  
3.2.2 Impact of Control Room Jobs on Ability Requirements  
With regard to the impact of the different jobs on the ability levels required, the 3 × 4 (Job 
× Ability Domain) ANOVA with the mean ability requirements in each domain as the dependent 
variable revealed a main effect of job, F(2, 184) = 7.39, p < .01, partial 2 = .07, as well as an 
interaction between job and ability domain, F(4.59, 422.32) = 18.26, p < .01, partial 2 = .18. In 
partial support of Hypothesis 2, which predicted an increase in the required level of cognitive 
abilities with increasing level of seniority of the job, Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons 
confirmed that shift supervisors and safety engineers both needed significantly higher levels of 
cognitive abilities than reactor operators. However, the cognitive ability requirements did not 
differ meaningfully between the two jobs. As an indicator of the effect size for differences 
between two means, we calculated Cohen’s d. Values for Cohen’s d are also given in Tables 1 to 
4. For the comparisons between reactor operators vs. shift supervisors and reactor operators vs. 
safety engineers, the effect sizes were -0.74 and -0.63, respectively. According to conventional 
standards, these values reflect intermediate to large effects (Cohen, 1992). Furthermore, 
comparable pairwise comparisons confirmed Hypothesis 3, which predicted that shift supervisors 
and safety engineers both need a significantly higher level of social/interpersonal abilities than 
reactor operators (Cohen’s d = -.82 and -.76). The size of these differences was large according to 
conventional standards. 
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In the next step, we analyzed the impact of the different control room jobs on the specific 
ability requirements in more detail. Specifically, we conducted a one-factorial multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) for each ability domain, for which we compared the three 
different jobs and considered the separate abilities as the dependent variables. With regard to 
cognitive abilities, the MANOVA confirmed the impact of the three different job positions on the 
abilities required as indicated by a main effect of job, Wilks’  = .61, F(32, 338) = 2.94, p < .01. 
For each ability, Table 1 also shows the results of Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons 
between the different control room jobs and the effect sizes obtained. As can be seen, about 63% 
of the considered abilities showed significant differences in requirement levels between the three 
jobs. In half of these cases, shift supervisors and safety engineers both needed significantly 
higher ability levels than reactor operators. In the remaining half, only the difference between 
shift supervisors and reactor operators was significant, with the former needing higher levels of 
the respective abilities. Effect sizes were of intermediate size in most of these cases. Finally, we 
did not find significant differences between shift supervisors and safety engineers for any of the 
cognitive abilities. These findings corroborate the finding from the previous analyses that 
Hypothesis 2 is only partially supported. Specifically, the results showed that the required levels 
of cognitive abilities increased from reactor operators to shift supervisors, but that shift 
supervisors and safety engineers did not differ significantly from each other. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
With regard to specific social and interpersonal abilities, the MANOVA also revealed a 
significant difference between the three job positions, Wilks’  = 0.41, F(38, 332) = 4.84 , p < 
.01. In line with Hypothesis 3, ability levels were higher for shift supervisors and safety engineers 
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than for reactor operators for nearly all of the abilities considered, with significant differences 
concerning many of the specific abilities, and effect sizes of these differences in the intermediate 
and large range (cf. Table 2). Furthermore, as illustrated by the results from Bonferroni-corrected 
t-tests, shift supervisors and safety engineers usually did not differ significantly, which is also in 
accordance with Hypothesis 3. The only exception from this pattern is Coaching, where we found 
a significantly higher level of this ability for shift supervisors than for safety engineers.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Even though we had no specific hypotheses concerning differences between the three 
control room jobs for psychomotor and physical abilities or for sensory and perceptual abilities, 
we also conducted MANOVAs for these domains so as to explore potential differences. With 
regard to psychomotor and physical abilities, we found a significant multivariate difference 
between the three job positions, Wilks’  = .72, F(12, 358) = 5.38 , p < .01. As can be seen in 
Table 3, safety engineers showed the lowest required levels for all abilities. In two cases (Control 
Precision and Finger Dexterity), these levels were significantly lower than for both reactor 
operators and shift supervisors, and in one case (Gross Body Equilibrium), there was a significant 
difference between safety engineers and shift supervisors. For abilities for which significant 
differences were found, effect sizes were large. The requirement levels between shift supervisors 
and reactor operators did not differ significantly in any of the cases. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------- 
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Finally, with regard to sensory and perceptual abilities, the MANOVA also showed a 
significant main effect of job, Wilks’  = .80, F(20, 350) = 2.01, p < .01. Similar to the domain 
of psychomotor and physical abilities, safety engineers needed these abilities to a lower degree 
than the other two jobs, meaning that several significant differences of intermediate size were 
found between safety engineers and reactor operators or shift supervisors. Furthermore, no 
significant differences were found between shift supervisors and reactor operators. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------- 
 
3.3 Discussion 
Our results showed that both factors evaluated in this study influenced the ability 
requirements of nuclear control room jobs. As expected, we found differences between different 
ability domains and between different control room jobs. In line with Hypothesis 1, control room 
employees in particular need cognitive as well as social/interpersonal abilities to a higher degree 
than psychomotor/physical or sensory/perceptual abilities. In partial support of Hypothesis 2, the 
jobs of shift supervisors and safety engineers require higher levels of cognitive abilities than 
reactor operators. However, in contrast to our hypothesis, the former two jobs did not differ 
meaningfully. This means that the main difference concerning the cognitive ability requirements 
for control room jobs is between reactor operators and the other two jobs. Furthermore, the 
assumptions made in Hypothesis 3 were confirmed, meaning that shift supervisors and safety 
engineers need a higher level of social and interpersonal abilities than reactor operators. Thus, in 
accordance with research by O’Connor et al. (2008), social and interpersonal abilities are more 
important for employees who hold leadership positions.  
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In addition to these specific hypotheses, several significant differences were found with 
regard to sensory and perceptual abilities, where the job of safety engineer has lower ability 
requirements than the other two jobs. Given that safety engineers do not have to monitor displays, 
read measured values, or identify auditory signals themselves in the control room, these 
differences seem obvious in retrospect. Finally, we found several significant differences between 
ability requirements for the domain of psychomotor/physical abilities. Even though some of these 
differences reached large effect sizes (reflecting lower required levels for safety engineers), it 
should be noted that hardly any of the means in this domain lay above 4. Thus, according to 
Fleishman and Railly (1995), the corresponding abilities cannot be considered relevant for the 
different control room jobs, indicating that the psychomotor and physical ability requirements for 
these jobs are generally relatively low.  
 
4. Study 2 
A limitation of Study 1 was that it did not address the potential impact of differences 
between operating conditions on ability requirements. Thus, the aim of Study 2 was to close this 
gap and to compare requirements for control room jobs under different working conditions.  
 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants 
One hundred control room employees served as participants for Study 2. Of these, 64 
were reactor operators and 36 were shift supervisors. Safety engineers were not considered as 
participants in Study 2 because they are not usually present in the control room during normal 
operations but only come to the control room during an emergency alert; therefore, it was not 
possible to compare the two operating conditions for safety engineers. The mean age was 42.47 
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for reactor operators (SD = 8.32) and 49.80 (SD = 7.06) for shift supervisors. On average, reactor 
operators had 9.52 years (SD = 9.37) of job experience and shift supervisors had 11.53 years (SD 
= 9.03) of job experience. These employees came from three of the four power plants considered 
in Study 1 (Plants B, C, and D).  
 
4.1.2 Job Analysis Instrument  
As in Study 1, the German version of the Fleishman Job Analysis Survey (F-JAS, 
Kleinmann et al., 2010) was used to determine the ability requirements for both operating 
conditions and both control room jobs. Furthermore, the same 51 abilities as in the first study 
were included in the present survey.  
 
4.1.3 Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Study 1, with the following exceptions: The data 
collection was conducted in 14 group sessions during working hours in the training classrooms of 
the nuclear power plants. Between 4 and 11 employees participated in each session. Employees 
only rated the ability requirements for either normal operating conditions or for incidents (half of 
the reactor operators and half of the shift supervisors were assigned to each operating condition).  
 
4.1.4 Reliability of Participants’ Ratings 
As in Study 1, we calculated interclass correlations for participants’ ratings of the required 
ability levels in order to determine the reliability of these ratings. The mean reliability (ICC 2,1) 
for the normal operating condition was .95 across 32 reactor operators, and .96 across 18 shift 
supervisors; for the incident condition, it was .96 across 32 reactor operators, and .96 across 18 
shift supervisors. Thus, the obtained values were quite similar to those in the first study.  
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4.2 Results  
4.2.1 Impact of Operating Condition on Ability Requirements for Reactor Operators 
To determine the impact of the operating condition, we first conducted a 2 × 4 ANOVA 
for the reactor operator sample with the between-subject factors operating condition (normal 
operating condition vs. incident) and the within-subjects factor ability domain (cognitive, 
social/interpersonal, psychomotor/physical, or sensory/perceptual). This ANOVA, which used 
the mean ability level from each domain as the dependent variable, revealed a main effect of 
ability domain, F(2.58, 159.83) = 196.61, p < .01, partial 2 =76. This mirrors the differences in 
ability requirements that were found in Study 1. More importantly, however, there was no 
significant main effect for the operating condition and no interaction between operating condition 
and ability domain, both Fs < 1.08, both ps < .31.  
In addition to this overall ANOVA, we also conducted separate one-factorial MANOVAs 
for each ability domain, in which we evaluated the impact of the operating condition in more 
detail. These MANOVAs revealed significant effects of the operating condition for social and 
interpersonal abilities, Wilks’  = 51, F(19, 44) = 2.23, p < .05, and for sensory and perceptual 
abilities, Wilks’  = .70, F(10, 53) = 2.26, p < .05. These main effects indicate that somewhat 
higher levels of these abilities are required in the incident condition than in the normal operating 
condition. However, the operating condition did not significantly influence ability requirements 
in the domains of cognitive abilities or of psychomotor and physical abilities, both Wilks’ s > 
.76, both Fs < 1. Furthermore, average effect sizes were not large for any of these domains (all ds 
< .24). 
Finally, we also compared the required ability levels for each ability. Table 5 gives an 
overview of all abilities that differed significantly between the two conditions. As can be seen, 
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the absolute number of abilities for which significant differences were found was rather small 
(only 6 out of 51). In line with the results from the multivariate analyses, of the abilities which 
required higher levels in the incident condition, three were from the social/interpersonal domain 
(Behavior Flexibility, Self Control, and Oral Defense), and two were from the sensory/perceptual 
domain (Speech Recognition and Auditory Attention). Finally, one ability from the cognitive 
domain (Time Sharing) was needed to a larger degree in the incident condition. Thus, these 
results provide only partial support for Hypothesis 4, which predicted that higher levels of 
cognitive and of sensory/perceptual abilities are needed in the incident condition. However, it 
should be noted that the effect sizes were in the medium to large range for all of the abilities in 
which the two operating conditions differed significantly. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------- 
 
4.2.2 Impact of Operating Condition on Ability Requirements for Shift Supervisors 
Concerning mean ability levels from each domain, the differences between the two 
conditions were larger for shift supervisors than for reactor operators. Accordingly, the 2 × 4 
ANOVA for the shift supervisors with the between-subjects factors operating condition (normal 
operating condition vs. incident) and the within-subjects factor ability domain (cognitive, 
psychomotor/physical, sensory/perceptual, or social/interpersonal) revealed a significant 
interaction between operating condition and ability domain, F(3, 102) = 3.26, p < .05, partial 2 = 
.09, in addition to the significant main effect of the ability domains, F(3, 102) = 229.73, p < .01, 
partial 2 = 87.  
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The reason for the significant interaction was that the effects of the operating conditions 
were larger on some domains than on others. Specifically, separate one-factorial MANOVAs for 
each ability domain revealed significant effects of the operating condition for cognitive abilities, 
Wilks’  = 29, F(16, 19) = 2.94, p < .05, as well as for social and interpersonal abilities, Wilks’ 
 = .19, F(19, 16) = 3.62, p < .01. In line with Hypothesis 4, ability requirements for cognitive 
abilities were generally (somewhat) higher in the incident condition (average effect size across all 
cognitive abilities d = -.22), and with regard to Hypothesis 5, ability requirements for social and 
interpersonal abilities were generally higher in the normal operating condition (average d across 
all social and interpersonal abilities = .39). Concerning the domains of psychomotor and physical 
abilities and of sensory and perceptual abilities, the MANOVAs did not reveal significant 
differences between the two operating conditions, both Wilks’ s > .69, both Fs < 1.92, both ps > 
.11.  
Finally, Table 6 shows the specific abilities for which we found significant differences 
between the two operating conditions. In line with the multivariate analyses and also in 
accordance with Hypothesis 5, several social and interpersonal abilities that are related to a 
participative leadership style (Agreeableness, Social Sensitivity, Negotiation, Sociability, 
Openness to Experience, and Coaching) were needed to a higher degree in the normal operating 
condition than in the incident condition. In addition, the only social and interpersonal ability 
related to a directive leadership style that is needed to higher degree in the incident condition was 
Perseverance. Furthermore, for two specific cognitive abilities (Problem Sensitivity and Written 
Expression), and for one psychomotor and physical ability (Explosive Strength), significant 
differences were found between the two conditions. The ability requirements for Written 
Expression and Explosive Strength were both lower in the incident condition than in the normal 
operating condition, whereas the opposite was the case for Problem Sensitivity. Thus, Written 
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Expression represents an exception to the generally higher ability requirements in the incident 
condition that were found in the multivariate analyses. Finally, it should be noted that effect sizes 
for the abilities for which the two operating conditions differed were substantial – often, they 
were even larger than what would usually be considered a large effect (.80, cf. Cohen, 1992). 
This means that ability requirements differed considerably between the two operating conditions 
in the case of a few very specific abilities.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------- 
 
4.3 Discussion 
Study 2 addressed the question of whether ability requirements for control room jobs 
differ in relation to the operating condition. Our results confirmed the existence of such 
differences between normal operating vs. incident conditions, although these differences were 
generally limited to a small number of abilities. Importantly, however, for the specific abilities 
for which significant differences were found, effects sizes were substantial.  
Specifically, the effects of operating condition on cognitive and on sensory and perceptual 
abilities predicted by Hypothesis 4 were only partially confirmed. As expected, reactor operators 
need sensory and perceptual abilities to a higher degree in the incident condition than in the 
normal operating condition. However, no such effect was found for shift supervisors. In contrast, 
with regard to cognitive abilities, no effect of operating condition was found for reactor operators 
(with the exception of Time Sharing), but an effect was found for shift supervisors. A notable 
exception here was Written Expression, which is required to a substantially lower degree in the 
incident condition than under normal operations.  
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Concerning the impact of the operating condition on social and interpersonal abilities, 
there was some support for Hypothesis 5, meaning that there were differences between the ability 
requirements for shift supervisors. These differences particularly reflected the need for a more 
participative leadership style in the normal operating condition as compared to the incident 
condition. Or in other words: The incident condition requires a more directive leadership style.  
 
5. General Discussion 
From a system perspective (Hofmann et al., 1995; Hollnagel, 2004; Reason, 2008), both 
technical and human factors contribute to the safety of complex systems. Human factors are 
important on different levels. The organization of safety requires good management decisions, 
embedded organizational processes and a safety culture. Favorable workplace conditions and 
suitable job incumbents also improve the safety of complex systems. Therefore, the errors 
associated with human factors are an essential source of nuclear power plant accidents and 
incidents (O'Hara et al., 2004).  
Accordingly, Buffardi et al. (2000) found a systematic relationship between ability 
requirements for tasks in nuclear power plants and human error probabilities. However, specific 
knowledge about the ability requirements for control room staff in nuclear power plants has so far 
been lacking. Thus, the present research makes several important contributions in this regard.  
First, the present study is the first investigation to include a systematic analysis of ability 
requirements for different control room jobs and different operating conditions. As such, an 
important aspect of this research is that it provides a reference for information concerning the 
required abilities for these control room jobs. This information can be used for the selection of 
control room personnel to ensure that none of the important abilities are overlooked. 
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Additionally, it can also be used for training purposes and the development of training programs 
(IAEA, 2000) or for job redesign.  
Although there is only limited research about the trainability of specific F-JAS skills and 
abilities (Kleinmann et al., 2010), research in the safety domain has generated promising 
evidence and provides specific recommendations concerning the trainability of safety behavior. 
In a meta-analysis, Burke et al. (2006), for example, investigated the effectiveness of different 
training methods on employee safety and health. Specifically, they distinguished between three 
categories of training interventions: least engaging (e.g., lectures, pamphlets), moderately 
engaging (e.g., feedback interventions) and most engaging (e.g., behavioral modeling, hands-on 
training). As training methods became more engaging, trainees demonstrated better acquisition of 
safety knowledge, better safety-related behavior, and reductions were seen in accidents and 
injuries. However, all methods of training led to meaningful behavioral performance 
improvements. Furthermore, additional meta-analytic research in the training domain also 
confirmed that training can improve skills from all of the ability domains covered by the F-JAS 
(Arthur et al., 2003; Taylor et al., 2005).Therefore, it seems likely that training can help to 
develop certain skills and abilities that are covered by the F-JAS.  
With regard to job redesign, the information provided by the job analysis also has 
important implications. Specifically, identifying tasks with requirements for high levels of 
specific abilities may lead to the use of job aids, the redesign of these tasks, or the reallocation of 
such tasks to individuals who possess higher levels of these abilities. In this way, a better match 
between employees’ abilities and relevant job requirements can be ensured, which will contribute 
to lower human error probabilities and thus to better nuclear safety in the long term. 
As a second contribution, our findings confirmed that ability requirements are not only 
high for cognitive abilities but also for social and interpersonal abilities for all three control room 
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jobs considered. This is an important finding, especially given that social and interpersonal 
abilities are not considered in O*NET (2010b), which is – as noted above – the database 
providing the most systematically collected information on job requirements for jobs in nuclear 
power plants. However, our findings are in line with results from other fields with high demands 
on safety issues such as aviation, where research has even revealed an increase in the importance 
of social and interpersonal abilities (Goeters et al., 2004; Maschke, 2004). The parallels between 
these fields are not surprising given that employees in both fields have to handle complex 
technical systems and often work in teams with shared responsibilities. Furthermore, ability 
requirements for cognitive and social/interpersonal abilities were higher than for the domains of 
psychomotor/physical as well as sensory/perceptual abilities. Again, this has important 
implications for selection and training, in which the domain of social/interpersonal abilities 
should be given appropriate consideration in addition to the domain of cognitive abilities.  
A third contribution of our research lies in its confirmation of the existence of differences 
between control room jobs. This is important because the limited available information on ability 
requirements for control room jobs does not distinguish between different jobs (O*NET, 2010b). 
In particular, we found differences between ability requirements for cognitive as well as for 
social and interpersonal abilities between the jobs of reactor operator and the two hierarchically 
higher jobs. As predicted, reactor operators need lower levels of these abilities than the other two 
jobs. These findings are in line with those of Lin et al. (2009), who found that the job of shift 
supervisor involves more cognitive tasks than the job of reactor operator. However, contrary to 
our assumptions, there were no meaningful differences between the job of shift supervisor and 
the hierarchically higher job of safety engineer in the domain of cognitive abilities. Similarly, in 
the domain of social/interpersonal abilities, the two jobs only differ with respect to the ability of 
Coaching, and this ability is needed to a higher degree for the job of shift supervisor. A possible 
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reason for the small size of the differences found between the two jobs could be that we only 
considered ability requirements needed in relation to control room tasks. However, the job of 
safety engineers includes a wide range of additional tasks that are independent of control room 
activities, such as training or research. Finally, ability requirements for safety engineers are lower 
than for the hierarchically lower jobs of shift supervisor and reactor operator in the domains of 
psychomotor/physical and sensory/perceptual abilities. This finding is not surprising given that 
safety engineers do not have to gather information or monitor the various signals themselves 
when they are in the control room. Instead, their main task is to support the shift supervisor and 
to take the lead during high-risk emergency alerts. Thus, shift supervisors and reactor operators 
provide safety engineers with the necessary information, meaning that required levels of 
psychomotor/physical and sensory/perceptual abilities are higher for the former two jobs than for 
the latter. Given the limited applicant market for nuclear control room jobs, the somewhat limited 
differences between different types of control room jobs are beneficial for selection and 
development purposes. Specifically, with appropriate training, it seems possible to ensure that 
employees can meet the ability requirements for hierarchically higher jobs after they have worked 
as reactor operators for some years. 
Finally, in line with contingency models of leadership, our results showed that ability 
requirements differed between normal operating conditions and incident conditions, but that these 
differences were limited to a small number of abilities, especially for reactor operators. For shift 
supervisors, the main differences concerning ability requirements between the two operating 
conditions were found in the domain of social/interpersonal abilities. In this domain, however, 
differences were substantial for the few abilities concerned. This indicates that the two conditions 
differ in the necessary leadership style, with leadership during an incident having to be more 
directive than in the normal operating condition. Accordingly, abilities such as Agreeableness, 
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Negotiation, Sociability, Social Sensitivity, and Coaching are needed to a higher degree in the 
normal operating condition. 
 
5.1 Limitations and Lines for Future Research 
The present research made several important contributions. Nevertheless, there are also 
several limitations that need to be addressed. First, we determined ability requirements for 
different control room jobs, but were unable to link these requirements to specific errors or error 
probabilities. Although Buffardi et al. (2000) found such links in their study in nuclear power 
plants, additional research is necessary to confirm these potential relationships for the relevant 
abilities identified in the present studies, and this seems especially relevant for social and 
interpersonal abilities, as such abilities were not considered by Buffardi et al. (2000). 
Furthermore, it might well be the case that additional abilities are relevant to actively prevent 
safety-related problems.  
Second, the present research only focused on the individual level as a level that is relevant 
for safety in nuclear power plants. However, as noted above, a system perspective including both 
human errors and technical system components as well as the organizational context seems to be 
most appropriate (e.g., Hofmann et al., 1995; Hollnagel, 2004; Reason, 2008). Thus, future 
research is needed to investigate the interplay of these different factors.  
Third, the present research focused on ability requirements to perform the specific jobs in 
the control room. However, in addition to abilities that are necessary to perform a job, additional 
aspects on the part of the employees might be beneficial to foster safety-related behaviors and to 
implement a safety culture. Thus, as  noted above, the relationship between leaders and their 
subordinates is an important factor for safety communication (Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999; 
Reason, 1997). In addition, Hofmann and Morgeson (1999) also found that perceived 
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organizational support constitutes another social exchange variable in addition to leader-member 
exchange (LMX), which is more indicative of the organizational context but which also impacts 
safety communication.  
Finally, we have argued that evidence concerning the effectiveness of training shows 
promise, leading us to expect likely positive effects of training with regard to specific abilities 
identified in the present research. Nevertheless, as also noted above, evidence concerning the 
trainability of specific F-JAS skills and abilities is limited. Thus, future research is necessary to 
investigate and hopefully confirm our positive expectations.  
 
5.2 Conclusions 
Important factors for the safety of nuclear power plants include defenses-in-depth 
systems, organizational and workplace factors, individual skills, and the abilities of job 
incumbents. None of these factors should be neglected. Knowledge of these required abilities can 
help to improve safety through adequate personnel selection, training methods, and job redesign 
in nuclear power plants. The present research attempted to contribute to the safety of nuclear 
power plants by providing empirical data concerning requirements across a wide range of 
abilities and by considering the impact of different control room jobs and different working 
conditions on these requirements. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
We thank Filip Lievens for helpful discussions related to this research and Stephanie 
Hastings and Sarah Mannion de Hernandez for their help in improving the writing of the 
manuscript. 
Job requirements… 34
 
 
References 
Arthur, W., Jr., Bennett, W., Jr., Edens, P. S., Bell, S. T., 2003. Effectiveness of training in 
organizations: A meta-analysis of design and evaluation features. Journal of Applied 
Psychology 88, 234-245. 
Ash, R. A., 1988. Job analysis in the world of work. In: S. Gael (Ed.), The job analysis handbook 
for business, industry, and government. (Vol. 1), pp. 3-13. Wiley, New York. 
Buffardi, L. C., Fleishman, E. A., Morath, R. A., McCarthy, P. M., 2000. Relationships between 
ability requirements and human errors in job tasks. Journal of Applied Psychology 85, 
551-564. 
Burke, M. J., Sarpy, S. A., Smith-Crowe, K., Chan-Serafin, S., Salvador, R. O., Islam, G., 2006. 
Relative effectiveness of worker safety and health training methods. American Journal of 
Public Health 96, 315-324. 
Cannon-Bowers, J. A., Salas, E. (Eds.), 1998. Making decisions under stress: Implications for 
individual and team training. American Psychological Association, Washington, DC. 
Carvalho, P. V. R., dos Santos, I. L., Gomes, J. O., Borges, M. R. S., Guerlain, S., 2008. Human 
factors approach for evaluation and redesign of human-system interfaces of a nuclear 
power plant simulator. Displays 29, 273-284. 
Carvalho, P. V. R., dos Santos, I. L., Vidal, M. C. R., 2006. Safety implications of cultural and 
cognitive issues in nuclear power plant operation. Applied Ergonomics 37, 211-223. 
Cohen, J., 1992. A power primer. Psychological Bulletin 112, 155-159. 
Crichton, M., Flin, R., 2004. Identifying and training non-technical skills of nuclear emergency 
response teams. Annals of Nuclear Energy 31, 1317–1330. 
Job requirements… 35
Crichton, M., Lauche, K., Flin, R., 2005. Incident command skills in the management of an oil 
industry drilling incident: A case study. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 
13, 116-128. 
Flanagan, J. C., 1954. The critical incident technique. Psychological Bulletin 51, 327-358. 
Fleishman, E. A., 1995. Fleishman job analysis survey (F-JAS): Rating scale booklet. 
Management Research Institute, Potomac, MD. 
Fleishman, E. A., 1996. Fleishman job analysis survey (F-JAS) Part 2: Rating scale booklet 
social/interpersonal abilities. Management Research Institute, Potomac, MD. 
Fleishman, E. A., Buffardi, L. C., 1999. Predicting human error probabilities from the ability 
requirements of jobs in nuclear power plants. In: J. Misumi, B. Wilpert, R. Miller (Eds.), 
Nuclear safety: A human factors perspective, pp. 221-241. Taylor & Francis, London. 
Fleishman, E. A., Costanza, D. P., Marshall-Mies, J., 1999. Abilities. In: N. G. Peterson, M. D. 
Mumford, W. C. Borman, P. R. Jeanneret, E. A. Fleishman (Eds.), The O*NET content 
model: Structural considerations in describing jobs, pp. 175-195. American Psychological 
Association, Washington, DC. 
Fleishman, E. A., Mumford, M. D., 1991. Evaluating classifications of job behavior: A construct-
validation of the ability requirement scales. Personnel Psychology 44, 523-575. 
Fleishman, E. A., Quaintance, M. K., 1984. Taxonomies of human performance: The description 
of human tasks. Academic Press, Orlando, FL. 
Fleishman, E. A., Railly, M. E., 1995. Fleishman job analysis survey (F-JAS). Administrator's 
guide. Management Research Institute, Potomac, MD. 
Goeters, K.-M., Maschke, P., Eissfeldt, H., 2004. Ability requirements in core aviation 
profession: Job analyses of airline pilots and air traffic controllers. In: K.-M. Goeters 
(Ed.), Aviation Psychology: Practice and Research, pp. 99-119. Ashgate, Aldershot, UK. 
Job requirements… 36
Hofmann, D. A., Jacobs, R. R., Landy, F., 1995. High reliability process industries: Individual, 
micro, and macro organizational influences on safety performance. Journal of Safety 
Research 26, 131-149. 
Hofmann, D. A., Morgeson, F. P., 1999. Safety-related behavior as a social exchange: The role of 
perceived organizational support and leader-member exchange. Journal of Applied 
Psychology 84, 286-296. 
Hollnagel, E., 2004. Barriers and accident prevention. Ashgate, Aldershot, UK. 
Hwang, S.-L., Yau, Y.-J., Lin, Y.-T., Chen, J.-H., Huang, T.-H., Yenn, T.-C., Hsu, C.-C., 2008. 
Predicting work performance in nuclear power plants. Safety Science 46, 1115-1124. 
IAEA, 2000. Analysis phase of systematic approach to training (SAT) for nuclear plant personnel 
(IAEA-TECDOC-1170). International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria. 
Judge, T. A., Piccolo, R. F., Ilies, R., 2004. The forgotten ones? The validity of Consideration 
and Initiating Structure in leadership research. Journal of Applied Psychology 89, 36-51. 
Kapucu, N., Van Wart, M., 2008. Making matters worse: An anatomy of leadership failures in 
managing catastrophic events. Administration & Society 40, 711-740. 
Kleinmann, M., Manzey, D., Schumacher, S., Fleishman, E. A., 2010. Manual zum Fleishman 
Job Analyse System für eigenschaftsbezogene Anforderungsanalysen (F-JAS) [Manual 
for the German version of the Fleishman job analysis survey (F-JAS)]. Hogrefe, 
Göttingen, Germany. 
Landy, F., 1988. Selection procedure development and usage. In: Gael (Ed.), The job analysis 
handbook for business, industry, and government (Vol. 1), pp. 271-287. Wiley, New 
York. 
Lin, C. J., Jou, Y.-T., Yenn, T.-C., Hsieh, T.-L., Yang, C.-W., 2009. A study of control room 
staffing and workload from the human information processing perspective. In: 
Job requirements… 37
Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing and 
Control, pp. 303-307, Okayama, Japan. 
Maschke, P., 2004. Personality evaluation of applicants in aviation. In: K.-M. Goeters (Ed.), 
Aviation Psychology: Practice and Research, pp. 141-152. Ashgate, Aldershot, UK. 
Mumford, M. D., Peterson, N. G., 1999. The O*NET content model: Structural considerations in 
describing jobs. In: N. G. Peterson, M. D. Mumford, W. C. Borman, P. R. Jeanneret, E. A. 
Fleishman (Eds.), An occupational information system for the 21st century, pp. 21-30. 
American Psychological Association, Washington, DC. 
Mumford, T. V., Campion, M. A., Morgeson, F. P., 2007. The leadership skills strataplex: 
Leadership skill requirements across organizational levels. Leadership Quarterly 18, 154-
166. 
NEA, 2004. Nuclear regulatory challenges related to human performance. OECD Publications, 
Paris. 
O'Connor, P., O'Dea, A., Flin, R., Belton, S., 2008. Identifying the team skills required by nuclear 
power plant operations personnel. International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 38, 
1028-1037. 
O'Hara, J. M., Higgins, J. C., Persensky, J. J., Lewis, P. M., Bongarra, J. P., 2004. Human Factors 
Engineering Program Review Model (NUREG-0711, Rev. 2). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC. 
O*NET, 2010a. The O*NET content model. www.onetcenter.org/content.html (Jan. 14, 2010). 
O*NET, 2010b. Summary report for: 51-8011.00 - nuclear power reactor operators. 
http://online.onetcenter.org/link/summary/51-8011.00 (Jan. 14, 2010). 
Peterson, N. G., Mumford, M. D., Borman, W. C., Jeanneret, P., Fleishman, E. A., Levin, K. Y., 
Campion, M. A., Mayfield, M. S., Morgeson, F. P., Pearlman, K., Gowing, M. K., 
Job requirements… 38
Lancaster, A. R., Silver, M. B., Dye, D. M., 2001. Understanding work using the 
occupational information network (O*NET). Personnel Psychology 54, 451-492. 
Reason, J., 1997. Managing the risk of organizational accidents. Ashgate, Aldershot, UK. 
Reason, J., 2008. The human contribution: Unsafe acts, accidents and heroic recoveries. Ashgate, 
Farnham, UK. 
Samanta, P., Wong, S., Higgins, J., Haber, S., Luckas, W., 1988. A risk methodology to evaluate 
sensitivity of plant risk to human errors. In: E. W. Hagen (Ed.), Conference record of the 
1988 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 4th conference on human factor and 
nucllear power plants, pp. 249-258. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, New 
York. 
Shrout, P. E., Fleiss, J. L., 1979. Intraclass correlations: Uses in assessing rater reliability. 
Psychological Bulletin 86, 420-428. 
Taylor, P. J., Russ-Eft, D. F., Chan, D. W. L., 2005. A meta-analytic review of behavior 
modeling training. Journal of Applied Psychology 90, 692-709. 
Vroom, V. H., Jago, A. G., 1978. On the validity of the Vroom-Yetton model. Journal of Applied 
Psychology 63, 151-162. 
Vroom, V. H., Yetton, P. W., 1973. Leadership and decision-making. University of Pittsburgh 
Press, Pittsburgh, PA. 
Weick, K. E., 1990. The vulnerable system: An analysis of the Tenerife air disaster. Journal of 
Management 16, 571-593. 
Wilson, M. A., 2007. A history of job analysis. In: L. L. Koppes (Ed.), Historical perspectives in 
industrial and organizational psychology, pp. 219-241. Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ. 
Yukl, G., 2006. Leadership in organizations (6th ed.). Pearson, Upper Saddle River, NJ. 
 
Job requirements… 39
Figure 1. Example of an ability requirement scale measuring Written Comprehension (translated 
from the German version of the F-JAS) 
 
Oral 
Comprehension 
This is the ability to listen to and understand spoken words and 
sentences.  
How “Oral Comprehension” is different from other abilities 
“Oral Comprehension”: Involves listening to and 
understanding words and sentences spoken by 
others.  
vs. 
“Written Comprehension”: Involves reading 
and understanding written words and 
sentences.  
vs. 
“Oral Expression” and “Written Expression”: 
Involves speaking and writing words and 
sentences that others can understand  
 
 
    
 
7
    
The job or task requires understanding 
complex or detailed information that is 
presented orally, contains unusual words and 
phrases, and involves fine distinctions in 
meaning among words.  
 
    
6
   
   Understand the pleadings of the lawyers and the judge in a courtroom. 
5
  
    
4
   
The job or task requires understanding short 
or simple spoken information that contains 
common words and phrases.  
 
   Understand instructions for a sport. 
 
3
   
    
2
   Understand the lyrics of a nursery rhyme.    
1
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Table 1. Cognitive ability requirements for control room jobs 
Ability 
Reactor 
operator (RO)
Shift 
supervisor 
(SS) 
Safety 
engineer (SE) 
Differences between 
jobsa 
M SD M SD M SD RO-SS RO-SE SS-SE
Flexibility of Closure 4.28 1.19 4.98 0.98 4.78 1.23 -0.64** -0.42 0.19 
Fluency of Ideas 3.11 1.31 3.83 1.14 4.10 1.19 -0.58** -0.77** -0.23 
Information Ordering 4.85 0.81 5.37 0.78 5.25 0.98 -0.64** -0.46* 0.13 
Mathematical Reasoning 3.52 1.09 4.17 0.85 3.83 0.81 -0.65** -0.30 0.41 
Memorization 4.46 1.02 4.75 0.91 4.65 0.80 -0.30 -0.20 0.11 
Number Facility 4.02 1.08 4.53 0.89 4.63 1.05 -0.51* -0.56* -0.10 
Oral Comprehension 5.03 0.81 5.17 0.74 5.20 0.79 -0.17 -0.21 -0.04 
Oral Expression 5.01 0.75 5.42 0.79 5.25 0.87 -0.53* -0.30 0.20 
Problem Sensitivity 5.54 0.94 5.70 0.87 5.85 0.86 -0.18 -0.34 -0.17 
Selective Attention 5.26 0.95 5.38 0.85 5.40 1.03 -0.13 -0.14 -0.02 
Spatial Orientation 3.62 1.14 3.90 1.16 3.33 1.07 -0.24 0.26 0.51 
Speed of Closure 4.75 0.99 4.97 1.04 4.75 1.13 -0.22 0.00 0.20 
Time Sharing 5.36 0.86 5.72 0.87 5.75 0.74 -0.42* 0.48** -0.04 
Visualization 3.83 1.27 4.37 1.07 4.48 1.13 -0.45 -0.53* -0.10 
Written Comprehension 5.30 0.85 5.67 0.60 5.45 0.90 -0.48* -0.17 0.29 
Written Expression 3.91 1.14 4.65 0.88 4.58 0.78 -0.71** -0.64** 0.09 
Mean across cognitive abilities 4.49 0.55 4.91 0.59 4.83 0.53 -0.74** -0.63** 0.15 
  
Note. The scales ranged from 1 to 7 with larger numbers reflecting higher ability requirements. N 
= 87 reactor operators, 60 shift supervisors, and 40 safety engineers. a The size of the difference 
between the means for two jobs is given as Cohen’s d.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 2. Social and interpersonal ability requirements for control room jobs 
Ability 
Reactor 
operator (RO)
Shift 
supervisor 
(SS) 
Safety 
engineer (SE) 
Differences between 
jobsa 
M SD M SD M SD RO-SS RO-SE SS-SE 
Achievement Striving 4.44 0.90 4.78 0.69 4.93 0.94 -0.42 -0.53** -0.18 
Agreeableness 4.40 1.04 4.70 1.11 4.18 0.98 -0.28 0.22 0.49 
Assertiveness 4.87 0.91 5.67 0.68 5.65 0.80 -0.96** -0.88** 0.02 
Behavior Flexibility 4.78 0.97 5.13 0.98 5.48 0.85 -0.36 -0.74** -0.37 
Coaching 4.03 1.17 5.15 0.86 4.43 1.22 -1.06** -0.33 0.71**
Coordination 4.94 1.11 5.63 0.76 5.68 0.73 -0.70** -0.73** -0.06 
Dependability 6.48 0.74 6.43 0.59 6.50 0.68 0.07 -0.02 -0.11 
Negotiation 3.61 1.11 4.60 0.99 4.33 1.05 -0.93** -0.65** 0.27 
Openness to Experience 4.25 1.09 4.53 1.07 4.20 1.11 -0.26 0.05 0.31 
Oral Defense 4.14 1.13 4.73 0.92 5.05 1.11 -0.57** -0.81** -0.32 
Oral Fact Finding 5.02 1.07 5.52 0.89 5.90 0.71 -0.49* -0.90** -0.47 
Perseverance 5.76 0.86 5.58 0.93 5.58 1.03 0.20 0.20 0.01 
Resilience 4.43 1.04 4.77 0.98 5.08 1.14 -0.34 -0.61** -0.29 
Resistance to Premature Judgment 5.67 0.83 5.92 0.74 6.05 0.64 -0.31 -0.49* -0.19 
Self-Control 6.02 0.88 6.40 0.64 6.40 0.71 -0.48* -0.46* 0.00 
Sociability 4.37 1.17 4.68 1.03 4.55 1.06 -0.28 -0.16 0.13 
Social Confidence 4.48 1.04 5.28 0.64 5.43 0.78 -0.89** -0.97** -0.20 
Social Conformity 5.37 1.27 5.82 1.08 5.68 1.12 -0.38 -0.25 0.13 
Social Sensitivity 4.32 1.10 5.17 0.69 4.68 0.83 -0.88** -0.34 0.66 
Mean across social and 
interpersonal abilities 5.10 0.37 5.47 0.67 5.31 0.60 -0.82** -0.76** 0.08 
 
Note. The scales ranged from 1 to 7 with larger numbers reflecting higher ability requirements. N 
= 87 reactor operators, 60 shift supervisors, and 40 safety engineers. a The size of the difference 
between the means for two jobs is given as Cohen’s d.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 3: Psychomotor and physical ability requirements for control room jobs 
Ability 
Reactor 
operator (RO)
Shift 
supervisor 
(SS) 
Safety 
engineer (SE) Differences between jobs
a 
M SD M SD M SD RO-SS RO-SE SS-SE 
Control Precision 4.51 1.27 4.28 1.17 2.78 1.10 0.18 1.42** 1.32**
Explosive Strength 2.64 1.28 2.75 1.19 2.13 0.88 -0.09 0.44 0.58 
Finger Dexterity 3.26 1.22 3.37 1.25 2.43 0.68 -0.08 0.77** 0.89**
Gross Body Coordination 2.60 1.16 2.80 1.18 2.15 0.74 -0.17 0.43 0.63 
Gross Body Equilibrium 2.60 1.14 2.85 1.15 2.15 0.80 -0.22 0.43 0.68* 
Stamina 2.70 1.23 3.08 1.25 2.43 0.96 -0.31 0.24 0.58 
Mean across psychomotor 
and physical abilities 3.05 0.94 3.19 0.92 2.34 0.61 -0.15 0.83** 1.05**
 
Note. The scales ranged from 1 to 7, with larger numbers reflecting higher ability requirements. N 
= 87 reactor operators, 60 shift supervisors, and 40 safety engineers. a The size of the difference 
between the means for two jobs is given as Cohen’s d.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Job requirements… 43
Table 4: Sensory and perceptual ability requirements for control room jobs 
Ability 
Reactor 
operator (RO)
Shift 
supervisor 
(SS) 
Safety 
engineer (SE) 
 Differences between 
jobsa 
M SD M SD M SD RO-SS RO-SE SS-SE 
Auditory Attention 4.89 0.87 4.93 0.92 4.50 1.06 -0.05 0.41 0.44 
Depth Perception 3.08 1.30 3.15 1.18 2.35 0.80 -0.06 0.62** 0.77* 
Far Vision 4.16 0.94 4.38 0.94 3.73 0.75 -0.24 0.49 0.76* 
Hearing Sensitivity 4.02 1.07 4.13 1.14 3.50 0.96 -0.10 0.51* 0.59 
Near Vision 4.52 0.95 4.53 0.87 4.03 0.95 -0.02 0.52* 0.56 
Peripheral Vision 3.29 1.17 3.43 1.24 2.85 0.98 -0.12 0.39 0.51 
Sound Localization 3.75 1.35 3.92 1.00 3.25 1.19 -0.14 0.38 0.62* 
Speech Clarity 4.48 0.89 4.78 0.80 4.75 0.81 -0.35 -0.31 0.04 
Speech Recognition 4.48 1.10 4.85 0.92 4.48 1.15 -0.36 0.01 0.37 
Visual Color Discrimination 3.97 1.17 4.40 1.04 3.73 1.04 -0.39 0.21 0.65* 
Mean across sensory and 
perceptual abilities 4.28 0.64 4.46 0.75 3.60 0.68 -0.26 0.52** 0.82**
 
Note. The scales ranged from 1 to 7, with larger numbers reflecting higher ability requirements. N 
= 87 reactor operators, 60 shift supervisors, and 40 safety engineers. a The size of the difference 
between the means for two jobs is given as Cohen’s d.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
Job requirements… 44
Table 5. Means and standard deviations of the ability requirements that differ significantly 
between the two work conditions for reactor operators 
Ability 
Normal operation  Incident 
d 
M SD M SD 
Time Sharing (C) 5.31 1.09 5.88 0.87 -0.57* 
Behavior Flexibility (SI) 4.47 1.11 5.31 0.90 -0.84** 
Self-Control (SI) 5.44 1.27 6.34 0.94 -0.81** 
Oral Defense (SI) 4.06 1.34 4.88 1.16 -0.65* 
Auditory Attention (SP) 4.56 1.52 5.31 0.90 -0.60* 
Speech Recognition (SP) 4.34 1.41 5.28 0.92 -0.79** 
 
Note. The scales ranged from 1 to 7, with larger numbers reflecting higher ability requirements. N 
= 36. C = cognitive, SI = social and interpersonal, SP = sensory and perceptual. The size of the 
difference between the means for two jobs is given as Cohen’s d.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01  
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Table 6. Means and standard deviations of the ability requirements that differ significantly 
between the two work conditions for shift supervisors 
Ability 
Normal operation  Incident 
d 
M SD M SD 
Problem Sensitivity (C) 5.50 0.62 6.11 0.68 -0.94** 
Written Expression (C) 4.67 0.84 3.83 1.04 0.88* 
Agreeableness (SI) 5.22 0.73 3.39 0.98 2.12** 
Coaching (SI) 5.06 1.00 4.11 1.45 0.76* 
Negotiation (SI) 4.67 0.97 3.28 1.23 1.26** 
Openness to Experience (SI) 4.61 0.85 3.56 1.38 0.92** 
Perseverance (SI) 5.28 0.67 6.06 0.64 -1.19** 
Sociability (SI) 4.89 1.18 3.56 1.34 1.06** 
Social Sensitivity (SI) 5.17 0.79 3.28 1.32 1.74** 
Explosive Strength (PP) 2.33 0.91 1.78 0.65 0.71* 
 
Note. The scales ranged from 1 to 7, with larger numbers reflecting higher ability requirements. N 
= 64. C = cognitive, SI = social and interpersonal, SP = sensory and perceptual, PP = 
psychomotor and physical. The size of the difference between the means for two jobs is given as 
Cohen’s d.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
